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A B S T R A C T
Energy consumers can invest in photovoltaic (PV) panels and become prosumers. The benefit of such an
investment depends on the regulatory framework. We consider a population of heterogeneous consumers, with
respect to both the cost of decentralized production and their degree of self-consumption.it is efficient to have
investment by low-cost and high self-consumption profiles. We determine the optimal tariff in the presence
of heterogeneous prosumers. Net metering fails to screen consumers on the self-consumption dimension. Net
purchasing can lead to the efficient investment if the tariffs are non-Coasian that is fixed fees exceed the grid
operator’s fixed costs.1. Introduction
Motivations. The electricity sector is transforming worldwide. The
liberalization of upstream and downstream markets and the emergence
of renewable energy sources such as photovoltaics (PVs) and windmills
are creating new ways to consume and produce electricity. The afford-
ability of PV devices makes it feasible for households to self-consume
electricity, and could eventually lead to peer-to-peer exchanges of
self-produced energy. This new trend of households being both pro-
ducers and consumers of energy, called ‘‘prosumption’’, is facilitated
by technical developments such as battery systems, smart meters and
advanced business models that promote self-consumption through the
technical design of electricity systems. However, the success of these
developments depends on regulatory and administrative frameworks
for energy policy, grid financing, taxation and legal relationships, and
it requires innovative solutions coupled with suitable business and
management models to achieve a sustainable integrated system.
Households that purchase PV panels tend to stay connected to the
energy grid so they can purchase electricity when weather conditions
are not favorable for self-production. According to McKenna et al.
(2018), such households on average consume 45% of the electricity
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1 According to European Commission (JRE-SESI, 2020), by 2020 it is expected that almost 72% of European consumers will have a smart meter for electricity.
they produce, with the rest sold to the grid to satisfy the demand
of other consumers. However, this behavior varies significantly across
households. Since production largely depends on the level of solar
radiation, differences in self-consumption rates are for the most part
due to differences in consumption profiles. For example, a household
whose members stay at home during the day will self-consume much
more energy than a household whose members are away during the
day.
From a grid management perspective, self-consumption is relevant
because it reduces the amount of energy flows. By decreasing the
aggregate peak demand from the grid and injection to the grid, it can
further impact the costs associated with grid reinforcement investments
or energy losses related to congestion. Unfortunately, smart meters
have not yet been widely adopted1 and precise information about
the self-consumption rate of households is limited. In a near future,
new technological developments for smart metering as described for
instance in Sanchez-Sutil et al. (2019), and Cano Ortega et al. (2019),
may allow grid operators to use such precise information.
Methodology and results. The originality of this research is to
study how heterogeneous prosumer profiles for self-consumption interact
with the way tariffs are chosen. The key point is to introduce available online 8 December 2020
957-1787/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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synchronization factor as an heterogeneous variable. As a first approx-
imation, this aspect has been neglected in the previous microeconomic
literature analyzing the interactions between prosumers and the energy
system. This synchronization factor represents the individual degree
of self-consumption for consumers when they invest in PV to become
prosumers. It provides a measure of the degree of correlation between
the timing of consumption and the timing of production of PV panel,
depending on the individual variety of behaviors and situations. This
factor is of importance as prosumers with a higher self-consumption
profile are preferable for the grid operator in order to save costs related
to grid exchanges. We then study both net metering and net purchasing
systems, which are two common approaches used to integrate decen-
tralized production units (DPUs) into the energy system. Net metering
prices energy imports and exports the same, whereas net purchasing
sets different prices for each. We analyze how different tariff schemes
affect consumers’ decisions to become prosumers and we search for the
most efficient tariffs when the grid operator lacks information about
households’ self-consumption profiles.
Our main results are as follows. First, we show that consumers who
are relatively more inclined to self-consume are more likely to invest
in PV installations to become prosumers when a net purchasing system
is in place. Under net metering, investment decisions are independent
of self-consumption profiles. The reason is that under net purchasing,
energy sold to the grid is priced lower than energy drawn from the
grid. Hence, we show that net metering not only encourages too much
investment in DPUs but also attracts the wrong types of consumers to
invest in production from a grid management perspective. Our second
key result is that even if the grid operator has no information regarding
self-consumption profiles of prosumers, efficient tariffs can be achieved
through net purchasing. However, to be the case, tariffs should not be
Coasian, i.e. fixed fees paid by consumers and prosumers should exceed
the grid operator’s fixed costs. Overall, our analysis highlights that net
purchasing without Coasian tariffs provides a better way to integrate
prosumers in the energy system.
The economic literature. Our study belongs to a broader economic
iterature addressing electricity grid tariff regulation in the presence of
ecentralized energy sources.2 More precisely, we analyze the finan-
cial interactions between DPUs and network operators, primarily via
the grid tariff. The key idea of our analysis is to study how tariffs,
constrained by the available metering technology, are structured to
cover the (mostly fixed) network costs and how they will influence
the consumers’ decision to invest in PV’s. The main novelty in our
contribution is that we drop the representative consumer/prosumer
assumption to introduce heterogeneous agents, with respect to both
the cost of PV installation (related to their income, location and house
orientation) and the self-consumption profile (related to their consump-
tion habits). Grid tariff regulation is hardly able to catch this last
dimension, which potentially creates socially undesirable inefficiencies.
However, depending on the available metering technology, the social
cost of these inefficiencies can be mitigated or eliminated by using
judiciously adapted grid tariffs. In this sense, we extend the literature
and mainly Brown and Sappington (2017), Gautier et al. (2018) and
Cambini and Soroush (2020). These studies assumed that the choice
of electricity meter and the network tariff design could impact the
decision to become a prosumer. We build on these analyses by allowing
consumers to differ in their self-consumption rate. This novel feature
allows us to examine the types of households that decide to become
prosumers by investing in PVs and compare it with a centrally planned
allocation.
Our analysis shows the influence of the tariff structure on the
decision to invest in DPUs and on grid financing. Eid et al. (2014) and
La Monaca and Ryan (2017) have analyzed these two dimensions sep-
arately. The former estimate the impact of different grid tariffs on the
2 A survey of this strand of literature can be found in Burger et al. (2019).2
grid financing and the latter show that the tariff structure influences the
profitability of investment and, hence, the level of investment. Finally,
Wagner (2019) develops a spatial economics model to show that, in
a decentralized setting, the locational choice of renewable production
units is not always optimal and that the inefficiencies depend on the
tariff structure.
We also contribute to the literature on public utility regulation,
which is concerned with tariff structures. According to the classical
result of Coase (1956), two-part tariffs with volumetric charges set to
marginal costs and a fixed fee that recoups a monopoly’s fixed costs
lead to efficient outcomes. However, one of our key results is that, due
to agent heterogeneity, the optimal tariffs diverge from the Coasian
tariffs because of the heterogeneity in self-consumption profiles. To be
optimal (i.e. to attract the efficient number and type of prosumers), the
fixed fee needs to generate more revenue than the network operator’s
fixed costs. This fixed fee can also differ for prosumers and ordinary
consumers.
There is also a large and growing empirical literature that analyzes
the design of retail tariffs in the presence of distributed solar PV
using numerical simulations (see for example Schittekatte et al. (2018),
Solano et al. (2018), Clastres et al. (2019), Gunther et al. (2019) and
Young et al. (2019)). Most of these works focus on the incentives
to invest in solar PV and batteries to increase self-consumption in a
population of heterogeneous households and the influence of the grid
tariff on those investments. To our knowledge, none of these works
highlights that investing in PV will differ depending on the rate of self-
consumption, at the exception of Solano et al. (2018). However, this
approach abstracts from how this self-selection problem can further
impact the choice of tariffs but instead focuses on the heterogeneity
of the bill savings.
Outline. The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
he model, and Section 3 discusses the first-best outcome. Section 4
ighlights the two key policies chosen by the grid operator. Then,
ection 5 presents the net metering case, and Section 6 presents the net
urchasing case. Section 7 describes partial-netting, a hybrid system
etween net metering and net purchasing. Section 8 concludes. A
omenclature of variables and an Appendix are provided in Section 9
nd 10 respectively.
. Model
Our model builds on Gautier et al. (2018), where a separated and
egulated distribution system operator (DSO) operates a power grid as
monopoly. There are two other key groups in the energy system:
entralized electricity producers and consumers who can also become
roducers by investing in a DPU. By choosing the way DPUs are
ntegrated into the energy system and the prices that consumers pay
or exchanges with the grid, the DSO can encourage different numbers
nd profiles of consumers to invest in DPUs.
onsumers. Our model contains a population of consumers of size 1. All
onsumers have a fixed level of consumption 𝑞, giving them a surplus
. Consumers can install a DPU of capacity ?̃? that produces an energy
low 𝑘 = 𝛽?̃?, where 𝛽 is the average load factor of a consumer. The cost
of an installation of size ?̃? is equal to ?̃??̃?. The prosumer cost to produce
𝑘 is equal to 𝑧𝑘, with 𝑧 = ?̃?∕𝛽. We assume that all prosumers produce
the same quantity3 𝑘 < 𝑞. Prosumers differ in their installation cost
𝑧, and we consider an independent and log-concave distribution 𝑓 (𝑧)
on a closed interval, [𝑧, ?̄?]. Without loss of generality, we normalize
𝑧 = 0 and ?̄? = 1. Hence, the installation cost is the first source of
heterogeneity in our model.
We extend Gautier et al. (2018) by introducing a second source of
heterogeneity among consumers: a synchronization factor, 𝜑, which
3 As a result, we consider that none of the prosumer is self-sufficient


























represents the degree of self-consumption. Prosumers only consume
a fraction 𝜑𝑘 of the 𝑘 units they produce; the remaining (1 − 𝜑)𝑘 is
exported to the grid. The variable 𝜑 ∈ [0, 1], independently distributed
by 𝑔 (𝜑) between these two extreme self-consumption profiles. It mea-
sures the degree of correlation between the timing of consumption and
the timing of DPU production.4 When perfectly correlated, everything
that is produced by the PV installation is consumed at the place of
production. On the other hand, when 𝜑 = 0, all the decentralized
production is exported to the grid. In between these two extremes, this
variable tends to be very heterogeneous according to the literature on
self-consumption (see McLaren et al. (2015), Luthander et al. (2015)
and Lang et al. (2016)). Focusing on different contexts and using
different methods, McKenna et al. (2018) and Gautier et al. (2019) find
the heterogeneity results from daytime electricity usage at home. For
example, someone working from home will have a much higher self-
consumption rate than someone working away from home. Likewise,
there is more self-consumption in office buildings than in residences.
In the model, we represent self-consumption by this synchronization
factor.
We assume that the two parameters 𝑧 and 𝜑 are distributed inde-
pendently of each other.5 Each consumer is identified by two variables
(𝑧, 𝜑), and consumers are distributed on a square of size 1, where
the vertical axis represents the cost of installing a DPU (𝑧) and the
horizontal axis represents the synchronization factor (𝜑). We represent
the decision to become a prosumer by a binary variable 𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) ∈ {0, 1}.
If 𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) = 1, the household is a prosumer and produces 𝑘; if 𝑥 (𝑧, 𝜑) = 0,
the household only consumes electricity and does not produce any.
Cost of generation. Since the population size is 1, total consumption
is equal to 𝑞, which includes electricity that is produced by both the
centralized production unit (CPU) and DPUs. The CPU produces energy
at a unit cost 𝑐, which we assume lies between 𝑧 = 0 and 𝑧 = 1. Without
prosumers, the total generation cost would be 𝐶𝑔 = 𝑐𝑞.
The total production of DPUs is equal to 𝑘 ∫ 10 ∫
1
0 𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑)𝑓 (𝑧) 𝑔 (𝜑)
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{(1 − 𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑)) 𝑐𝑞 + 𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) [𝑧𝑘 + 𝑐(𝑞 − 𝑘)]} 𝑓 (𝑧) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑𝑑𝑧





𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) (𝑧 − 𝑐) 𝑓 (𝑧) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑𝑑𝑧.
Notice that the generation costs are independent of prosumers’ synchro-
nization factors.
Grid costs. There are two types of costs for the grids: fixed costs
associated with user and variable costs linked to the MWh of energy
distributed. We denote by 𝐾𝑐 the cost of connecting one user to the
grid and, as all users are connected, the sum of these costs is equal to
𝐾𝑐 . For prosumers, there is an additional cost of connecting their DPU
4 Note that behind this simplified parameter, we have the minute-to-minute
atching between the demand and the decentralized production of energy.
sing unidimensional parameter allows us to keep the model analytically
ractable.
5 This independence assumption allows for a simplified presentation of
esults, but our results hold if we impose a more general bivariate law 𝑓 (𝑧, 𝜑).
6 At first sight, this seems to be an extreme assumption. However we
take a capacity-based approach rather than a generation-based approach. As a
consequence, as noted before we do not explicitly model intermittency to make
things tractable. An additional argument is that intermittency is a problem at
the production stage but not at the distribution stage which is the focus of the
analysis.3
to the grid (such as change of meter and panel connection costs) and
this cost is denoted by 𝐾𝑙.
We use 𝜃𝑖 to denote the variable costs per MWh of power distributed
by centralized (𝑖 = 𝑐) and local exchanges (𝑖 = 𝑙).7 To simplify the
analysis, we assume that centralized and local energy exchanges have
the same variable costs per MWh: 𝜃𝑙 = 𝜃𝑐 = 𝜃.
Each prosumer consumes a fraction 𝜑 of their DPU’s production,
with the remaining amount exported and consumed by other consumers








𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑)(1 − 𝜑)𝑓 (𝑧) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑𝑑𝑧
)
𝑘. (1)
The total volume of centralized distribution (𝑉𝑐) is equal to the CPU’s
production:
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𝑘. (2)
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𝑓 (𝑧) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑𝑑𝑧 +𝐾𝑐 . (3)
We also denote 𝑐𝑑 = 𝐶𝑑 −𝐾𝑐 .
3. First-best outcome
The total cost of producing and distributing electricity for the entire
grid is given by the sum of generation costs 𝐶𝑔 and distribution costs
𝐶𝑑 given above. The total cost is:
𝐶 = 𝐶𝑔 + 𝐶𝑑







(𝑧 − 𝑐) 𝑘 − 𝜑𝜃𝑘 +𝐾𝑙
]
× 𝑓 (𝑧) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑𝑑𝑧 +𝐾𝑐 . (4)
benevolent social planner must determine whether an agent with the
haracteristics (𝑧, 𝜑) should purchase a DPU to become a prosumer or
hould remain a consumer. Given that consumption is fixed, the first-
est outcome minimizes the total cost of the energy system, which is
ccomplished by minimizing 𝐶 with respect 𝑥 (𝑧, 𝜑) ∈ {0, 1} and it
ntails the following8:
roposition 1. At the first-best outcome, 𝑥∗(𝑧, 𝜑) = 1 if 𝑧 ≤ 𝑧∗ (𝜑) =
+ 𝜑𝜃 − 𝐾𝑙𝑘 and 𝑥
∗(𝑧, 𝜑) = 0 otherwise.
The expression for the first-best outcome is similar to Brown and
appington (2017) and Gautier et al. (2018). The idea is that DPUs
hould be valued at the marginal cost of the centralized generation unit
et of the additional network costs created by the DPU. A DPU results
n additional connection costs but saves on distribution costs because
elf-consumption reduces power exchanges with the grid.
7 Local exchanges refer to power exchanges between a DPU and other
onsumers, and centralized exchanges refer to power exchanges between the
PU and consumers/prosumers.
8 All proofs are provided in the Appendix.


















Fig. 1. First-best prosumption (if 𝑐 − 𝐾𝑙
𝑘
> 0).
The first-best outcome identifies a frontier 𝑧∗(𝜑).9 Interestingly, the
frontier increases in 𝜑, meaning that consumers with a higher installa-
tion cost 𝑧 will become prosumers only if they have a higher level of
consumption. Self-consumption reduces exchanges with the grid and
the variable cost of operating the grid. Hence, a higher installation
cost can be recouped if there is a high degree of self-consumption.
This important consideration is often neglected in the design of policies
to encourage the installation of DPUs. Fig. 1 represents the first-best
frontier 𝑧∗(𝜑).
At the first-best outcome, the optimal mass of prosumers is 𝑀∗ =
∫ 10 ∫
𝑧∗(𝜑)
0 𝑓 (𝑧) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝑧𝑑𝜑 = ∫
1
0 𝐹 (𝑧
∗ (𝜑)) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑, and the total cost of
the electricity grid is






𝑧 − 𝑧∗ (𝜑)
]
𝑓 (𝑧) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝑧𝑑𝜑 +𝐾𝑐 .
In the following sections, we examine how the number and profile
of consumers who become prosumers changes when this decision is
decentralized, depending on the regulations in place.
4. Metering technologies and grid regulation
We now consider the outcome when consumers decide whether to
purchase a DPU. We consider an energy system where production and
distribution are separated. Production is a competitive activity, and the
energy price 𝑝 is equal to the marginal cost of CPUs: 𝑝 = 𝑐. Distribution
is a monopolistic activity, and an energy regulator fixes the tariff of the
DSO and organizes power exchanges between prosumers and the grid.
4.1. Metering technologies
Prosumers make two types of exchange with the grid. First, pro-
sumers supply power to the grid when their DPUs produce more
9 One additional side-product of DPU is that they are substitutes of the
roduction carbon-intensive energy sources. The positive impact of the deploy-
ent of renewables can also be considered by assuming a linear environmental
ost/damage function 𝐶𝑒 = 𝛿𝑉𝑐 . Doing so would just push up the first best
rontier to 𝑧∗ (𝜑) + 𝛿. Considering this aspect would not change our key result
s the self-selection problem would remain an issue under net metering due to
he inability of this technology to encourage comparatively more types with a4
igh degree of self-consumption to invest in DPU.electricity than prosumers can instantaneously consume. Second, a
prosumer draws power from the grid when their DPU’s production is
insufficient to meet their instantaneous consumption needs. A prosumer
with a synchronization factor 𝜑 supplies (1−𝜑)𝑘 to the grid and draws
𝑞 − 𝜑𝑘 from the grid.
Smart meters can record these two power flows separately. Alter-
natively, customers may have either two mechanical meters (one for
recording imports and another recording exports) or a single meter that
runs backwards when energy is exported to the grid (net metering). In
the latter case, the single meter records the net imports 𝑞 − 𝑘.
The synchronization factor 𝜑 and total consumption 𝑞 are not
eported on meter readings. A prosumer needs an additional meter to
ecord production, 𝑘,10 which allows 𝑞 and 𝜑 to be recovered ex-post
rom the meter readings.11
.2. Net metering and net purchasing
A consumer who purchases electricity from the grid pays the com-
odity price 𝑝 and a network fee 𝑟𝑚 > 0, which we refer to as the
‘import fee’’. A prosumer who provides electricity to the grid is paid
he commodity price 𝑝; however, the prosumer must pay an injection
ee 𝑟𝑥 that we call the ‘‘export fee’’. This export fee can be positive,
egative (in which case exports are subsidized by the DSO) or nil.
Net metering is a commonly used system in which imports and
xports have the same price (that is, 𝑟𝑚 = −𝑟𝑥). As discussed in
Moura and Brito (2019), net metering is used in most U.S. states,
Mexico, Brazil, Finland, India and Belgium, among other countries. Net
metering is the only possible system where prosumers have a single
mechanical meter to record their exchanges with the grid.
Under net purchasing, imports and exports are priced separately
(i.e. 𝑟𝑚 ≠ −𝑟𝑥).
4.3. Tariff structure
The tariff structure is regulated and must be set such that the DSO
can recover its total cost, 𝐶𝑑 .
We consider different tariff structures:
• A Coasian two-part tariff where each consumer pays a fixed fee
equal to the grid’s fixed cost 𝜌 = 𝐾𝑐 , and variable fees that are
designed to cover the variable costs, 𝑐𝑑 .
• A Coasian tariff where prosumers pay a supplementary fixed fee
to cover the specific fixed cost related with their DPU. In this tariff
structure, traditional consumers pay 𝜌 = 𝐾𝑐 and prosumers pay
𝜌 = 𝐾𝑐 +𝐾𝑝.12
• A non-Coasian two-part tariff where the tariff is designed to
minimize the total cost of the system (𝐶𝑑 + 𝐶𝑔).
We consider the effect of each tariff for both a net metering and
net purchasing system. Finally, we assume that the regulator cannot
observe 𝜑, that is, the regulator has no access to prosumers’ production
meters (if they exist as a smart metering system would be required).
10 In the case of solar PVs, a meter or an app installed on the inverter can
be used to measure a DPU’s production.
11 The export meter records (1−𝜑)𝑘, from which the synchronization factor
𝜑 can be computed. Total consumption 𝑞 can be calculated from the import
meter that records 𝑞 − 𝜑𝑘.
12 Cambini and Soroush (2020) discuss and compare different tariff struc-
tures under net metering. In particular, they focus on recovering fixed
connection costs linked to DPUs. The Coasian tariff corresponds to what they
call the ‘‘shallow connection cost’’, where fixed connection costs are recovered
by the variable part of the tariff. The Coasian tariff with a prosumer’s fixed fee
corresponds to the ‘‘deep connection cost’’. They show that charges associated
with deep connection costs achieve better results than charges associated with
shallow connection costs from a welfare point of view.












Fig. 2. Prosumers under net metering (Coasian tariff).
herefore, it cannot make the network tariff structure contingent on
prosumer’s synchronization factor and use this variable to screen
rospective prosumers. Furthermore, we will prove that a menu of
ontract where prosumers select their preferred option add no value
n this context.
. Net metering
.1. Prosumer’s investment decision
Consider net metering with a unique variable fee 𝑟 = 𝑟𝑚 = −𝑟𝑥 and a
fixed fee of 𝜌 per consumer. As in Gautier et al. (2018), the net utility of
a consumer who installs a DPU that produces 𝑘 ≤ 𝑞 and who consumes
that power at a rate 𝜑 is given by:
𝑈 (𝑧, 𝜑) =
{
𝑆 − (𝑐 + 𝑟)(𝑞 − 𝑘) − 𝜌 − 𝑧𝑘
𝑆 − (𝑐 + 𝑟)𝑞 − 𝜌
if 𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) = 1
𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) = 0.
The consumer is indifferent between investing or not investing in a DPU
if
?̃? = 𝑐 + 𝑟. (5)
Hence, we have
?̃? (𝑧, 𝜑) = 1 if 𝑧 ≤ 𝑐 + 𝑟
?̃? (𝑧, 𝜑) = 0 if 𝑧 > 𝑐 + 𝑟.
With net metering, the synchronization factor does not affect a
consumer’s investment decision. The reason is that net metering does
not differentiate between the price of the two energy flows, so the
prosumer’s electricity bill and resulting utility depend only on net
imports 𝑞 − 𝑘, independent of the synchronization level.
Therefore, as we rule out tariffs contingent on 𝜑, we can see that:
Proposition 2. It is impossible to achieve the first-best outcome with net
metering.5
5.2. Coasian tariff
With a Coasian tariff (𝜌 = 𝐾𝑐), the recorded consumption volume is





Given that ?̃?0 = 𝑐+ 𝑟0, the proportion of prosumers in the population is
𝐹 (?̃?0) = 𝐹 (𝑐 + 𝑟0). Replacing the cost 𝑐𝑑 and the recorded consumption















here ?̄? = ∫ 10 𝜑𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑 is the mean value of 𝜑, i.e. the average self-
consumption level for the society. The resulting cut-off value ?̃?0 = 𝑐+𝑟0
is represented in Fig. 2. We observe that the cut-off value is higher than
the first-best ?̃?0 > 𝑧∗ for all 𝜑 ∈ [0, 1] and is independent of 𝜑.
Proposition 3. Compared to the first-best outcome, net metering with a
Coasian tariff induces too many consumers to become prosumers.
This result is similar to the ‘‘death spiral’’ described in Brown and
Sappington (2017) and Gautier et al. (2018). The idea is that tariffs
do not send the right signal to consumers when they make investment
decisions. Consumers place too much value on installing a DPU because
the price at which they sell their energy to the network is the same as
the price at which they buy electricity from the network, even though
the variable costs faced by the DSO are higher for energy exported by
prosumers than for energy imported by prosumers. Since prosumption
is over-encouraged, the uniform tariff rate has to increase to ensure
that the DSO will break even, and this further encourages households
to become prosumers.
5.3. Coasian tariff with a higher fixed fee for prosumers
To limit the number of prosumers, the regulator can rebalance
the tariff structure by charging prosumers a higher fixed fee than
consumers, or by increasing the fixed fee charged to everyone (see
Section 5.4).
In the first case, the regulator imposes a fixed fee 𝜌𝑝 = 𝐾𝑐 + 𝐾𝑙
to prosumers and 𝜌 = 𝐾𝑐 to consumers. With such a fee, the cut-off
investment level is now:
?̃?1 = 𝑐 + 𝑟 −
𝐾𝑙
𝑘













Combining the two equations, we have:
?̃?1 = 𝑧∗ (𝜑) + 𝜃

























?̃?1 ≥ 𝑧∗ (𝜑) if 𝜑 ≤ ?̃?1
?̃?1 < 𝑧
∗ (𝜑) if 𝜑 > ?̃?1.
Under this tariff, prosumers pay for the fixed connection cost of the
DPU. Consequently, the variable fee can be reduced (𝑟1 < 𝑟0 ) and the
death spiral is avoided. The tariff is now based on the variable cost for
an average prosumer who has a self-consumption rate of ?̄?. This tariff
structure limits the number of prosumers by discouraging consumers
with higher self-consumption rates from becoming prosumers.
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𝑧
5.4. Optimal two-part tariff
Instead of charging prosumers an additional fixed fee, the regulator
can decrease the variable fee 𝑟 and increase the universal fixed fee 𝜌 to
decrease investments in DPUs, while guaranteeing that the DSO breaks
even or earns a profit. The optimal two-part tariff under net metering
is the solution of:
min
𝑟,𝜌
𝐶 subject to 𝑧 = 𝑐 + 𝑟 and 𝜌 + 𝑟(𝑞 − 𝐹 (𝑐 + 𝑟)𝑘) = 𝐶𝑑 .
The solution to this problem is to set the following unit tariff











where 𝐻 (𝑧) = 𝐹 (𝑧)𝑓 (𝑧) ≥ 0 which is increasing in 𝑧,
13 and to cover the
remaining costs of the DSO with the fixed fee
?̃?2 =
(














so that ?̃?2 >
(
(1 − ?̄?) 𝜃 + 𝐾𝑙𝑘
)
𝑞+𝐾𝑐 . We can show easily that there exists







with ?̃?2 = 𝑐 + 𝑟2 and such that
?̃?2 ≥ 𝑧∗ (𝜑) if 𝜑 ≤ ?̃?2
?̃?2 < 𝑧
∗ (𝜑) if 𝜑 > ?̃?2.
Under this tariff, the total fixed fees paid by consumers and prosumers
exceed the fixed connection costs associated with DPUs. As a result, the
variable fee can be reduced (𝑟2 < 𝑟0) and the death spiral is avoided.
The tariff is now set below the variable costs for an average prosumer
who exhibits a self-consumption rate of ?̄?, which takes into account
the total effect of the prosumer’s level. As was the case for the Coasian
tariff with a higher fixed fee for prosumers, this tariff structure also dis-
courages consumers with higher self-consumption rates from becoming
prosumers, resulting in fewer prosumers than under a Coasian tariff.
5.5. Menu pricing
It is ineffective to offer prosumers a menu of contracts (𝑟(𝜑), 𝜌(𝜑))
from which to choose from. Indeed, as a prosumer’s utility is indepen-
dent of 𝜑, all prosumers will pick the same tariff and it is impossible
to screen prosumers according to their synchronization factor. This is
because the DSO has no mechanism to observe the synchronization
factor, and prosumers have no incentive to reveal this information.
5.6. Comparisons
Comparing the three tariffs above, we establish:
Lemma 1. 𝑟2 < 𝑟1 < 𝑟0 and ?̃?2 < ?̃?1 < ?̃?0.
With a given net metering tariff, the total cost is:






𝑟𝑘 − 𝜑𝜃𝑘 +𝐾𝑙
]
𝑓 (𝑦) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝑦𝑑𝜑 +𝐾𝑐 ,
which increases with both (𝑟, 𝑧). Then, given Lemma 1, we have 𝐶∗ <
?̃?2 < ?̃?1 < ?̃?0.
Therefore, under net metering, the optimal tariff consists of charg-
ing a high fixed fee independent of consumption. This fee should cover
the fixed grid cost and part of the variable costs. Increasing the fixed
fee above the Coasian level limits incentives to become a prosumer and
reduces grid costs. Indeed, from Lemma 1, we have that ?̃?2 < ?̃?1 < ?̃?0
13 This is due to the log concavity of 𝑓 (𝑧).6
Fig. 3. Comparisons.




is the mass of active prosumers for 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2.14
Finally, the first-best outcome can never be achieved under net meter-
ing as the regulator cannot make the tariff (and subsequent investment
decisions by consumers) contingent on the level of self-consumption
(see Fig. 3).
6. Net purchasing
We now consider the case where the DSO can implement a net
purchasing system, which requires that prosumers be equipped with
smart meters or mechanical meters with two separate lines to measure
imports and exports.
6.1. The prosumer’s investment decision
Under a net purchasing scheme, the net utility of a prosumer who








𝑆 − 𝑐(𝑞 − 𝑘) − 𝑟𝑚 (𝑞 − 𝜑𝑘)






if 𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) = 1
𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) = 0.
For a consumer who is indifferent between becoming a prosumer or
remaining a consumer, we have:
̂ (𝜑) = 𝑐 + 𝜑𝑟𝑚 − (1 − 𝜑) 𝑟𝑥. (7)
Therefore, only agents with preferences (𝑧, 𝜑) such that 𝑧 ≤ ?̂? (𝜑) will
become prosumers.
14 However, one cannot compare these masses to the one in the first-best
𝑀∗, as it depends on the particular distribution of 𝑧.



































Let us first consider a Coasian tariff such that 𝜌 = 𝐾𝑐 . It is now clear
that net purchasing can only lead to the first-best quantity of prosumers

















owever this tariff structure is not profitable for the DSO, as it leads
o a loss of 𝐾𝑙𝑞∕𝑘.
roposition 4. Under a net purchasing system, Coasian tariffs cannot
chieve the first-best outcome.
This result contrasts with Gautier et al. (2018), where a net pur-
hasing system with a uniform tariff is shown to lead to an efficient
utcome. We have that the import rate must be set below the marginal
ost 𝜃 and the export rate is used to fully charge prosumers the fixed
istribution cost of a DPU installation. This makes it impossible to
onstruct a tariff that is fully cost-reflective and that induces an efficient
eployment of DPUs. The source of heterogeneity in the society is
lso coming from the different synchronization factors between a DPU
wner’s consumption and production. Moreover, net purchasing with
Coasian tariff generates distortions differently than Coasian tariffs
nder net metering. Indeed, with net purchasing the first best would
e achievable but at the social cost of a profit loss for the DSO.
onsequently, it is not implementable due to a productive distortion.
ith net metering the first best is unachievable but the DSO breaks
ven, it is not implementable due to an allocative distortion. As a result,
he Coasian tariff distortions are not comparable with respect to the
etering regime.
Since an efficiency-inducing uniform tariff is not feasible, let us
onsider a second-best uniform Coasian tariff under a net purchasing
cheme that ensures the DSO can recoup its costs and minimizes the











+ 𝑟𝑥𝑉𝑙 − 𝑐𝑑 ≥ 0
with 𝑥 (𝑧, 𝜑) = 1 if 𝑧 ≤ ?̂? (𝜑) = 𝑐 + 𝜑𝑟𝑚 − (1 − 𝜑) 𝑟𝑥, for all 𝜑 ∈ [0, 1].
(9)
We solve this problem in the Appendix. The solution gives us the
following result, using the following notations ?̂? = ∫ 10 𝐹 (?̂? (𝜑)) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑
and ?̂? = ∫ 10 𝜑𝐹 (?̂? (𝜑)) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑:
Proposition 5. The second-best uniform tariff structure with net purchas-
ing is


















where 𝛤 < 1.
The second-best uniform tariff allows us to define the prosumption




, which is steeper than the optimal
locus.
So there may exist ?̂? (?̂?) = 𝑧∗ (?̂?) with ?̂? (𝜑) ≤ 𝑧∗ (𝜑) for 𝜑 ≤
̂ and conversely. Hence, the second-best uniform tariff under a net
purchasing scheme favors highly synchronized agents, as they are more
likely to invest in a DPU compared with the first-best outcome (see7
Fig. 4).Fig. 4. The second-best quantity of prosumption under a net purchasing scheme is in
green. The first-best level is in blue.
6.3. Optimal tariffs
Although a Coasian tariff cannot achieve the first-best quantity
of prosumption, it can still be achieved under net purchasing. The
regulator can either relax the Coasian constraint and increase the fixed
fee, or it can charge different tariffs for prosumers and consumers.
By doing so, it can better allocate the specific costs linked to DPUs
to prosumers, as proposed by Cambini and Soroush (2020), among
others. We now show that the first-best quantity of prosumption can
be achieved with simple tariff structures.
First, the regulator can depart from Coasian tariffs and increase the
fixed fee paid by consumers. With 𝜌 > 𝐾𝑐 , it is possible to recover the
grid costs and use the grid tariff given by Eq. (8) to achieve the first-best
outcome. The following tariff accomplishes this:










Second, the regulator can impose a discriminatory tariff that charges
prosumers and consumers different rates for their energy imports. Let
us denote prosumers’ import and export fees by 𝑟𝑚 and 𝑟𝑥, respectively,
and use 𝑟𝑐 to denote consumers’ import fees. The following Coasian
tariff (𝑟𝑚, 𝑟𝑥, 𝑟𝑐 , 𝜌) achieves the first-best outcome:






, 𝑟𝑐 = 𝜃, 𝜌 = 𝐾𝑐 .
Third, the regulator can charge an additional fixed fee to prosumers
to recover the additional costs they impose on the DSO. If we denote
this fee by 𝜌𝑝, the following tariff (𝑟𝑚, 𝑟𝑥, 𝜌𝑝, 𝜌) achieves the first-best
outcome:
𝑟𝑚 = 𝜃, 𝑟𝑥 = 0, 𝜌𝑝 = 𝐾𝑙 +𝐾𝑐 , 𝜌 = 𝐾𝑐 .
6.4. Menu pricing
We previously showed that it is not possible to use menu pricing
under a net metering scheme to identify different types of prosumers.
Under a net purchasing regime, screening consumers by proposing
menus of tariffs is not relevant. As explained in Section 4, when agents
are equipped with smart meters or two mechanical meters, synchro-
nization is technically observable and net purchasing tariffs can be
implemented with full information about self-consumption. However,







this information is not required for the DSO to construct an efficiency-
inducing two-part tariff, as it can be done through cost parameters
alone.
7. Partial-netting
The partial-netting (PN) described by Koumparou et al. (2017) is
a variant of net metering. They show that this does not systematically
lead to over-returns on investments by prosumers as illustrated by the
experience in Greece. Under partial-netting, if over a billing period, the
imported energy (𝑞−𝜑𝑘 ) is larger than the exported energy ((1−𝜑)𝑘),
that is if 𝑞 > 𝑘, the prosumer pays the retail rate (𝑐 + 𝑟𝑚) on the net
imports15; that is, the prosumer pays (𝑐+𝑟𝑚)(𝑞−𝑘) as under net metering.
The prosumer also pays a specific fee (𝑟𝑥) on energy exports. Partial-
netting is a hybrid system where energy net imports are priced as under
net metering and energy exports are priced as under net purchasing.
The Partial-netting system can be implemented either with a net
purchasing or net metering scheme. In the former case, the export fee
is based on the actual export level; in the latter, it is based on an
estimation ?̄? of the self-consumption level.
7.1. Partial-netting with bi-directional metering
Under a PN scheme and bi-directional meters, the net utility of
a prosumer who can install a DPU producing 𝑘 and with a self-
consumption level 𝜑 is given by
𝑈 (𝑧) =
{






if 𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) = 1
𝑥(𝑧, 𝜑) = 0.
The consumer is indifferent between investing or not in a DPU if
?̃?𝑝 = 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑚 − (1 − 𝜑)𝑟𝑥.
The first best can be achieved with 𝑟𝑚 = 𝜃 −
𝐾𝑙
𝑘 and 𝑟𝑥 = 𝜃 and
n appropriate fixed fee allowing the DSO breaks even such that 𝜌 =
𝐾𝑙
𝑘 𝑞 + 𝐾𝑐 > 𝐾𝑐 , that is with non-Coasian tariff structure. The partial-
etting system is closely comparable to the net-purchasing regime we
escribed in Section 6.
.2. Partial-netting with single metering
With a single meter, the export fee in the above equation should
e replaced by the estimated average value 𝑟𝑥 (1 − ?̄?) 𝑘. The decision to
become prosumer is then independent of the actual value of 𝜑 and it is
given by: ?̃?𝑝 = 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑚 − (1 − ?̄?)𝑟𝑥. As for the net metering case, the first
best cannot be reached; that is, consumers turn to prosumers if their
installation cost is lower than a given threshold that is independent of
the actual self-consumption level.
Compared to the Coasian tariff we analyzed above, the export fee
gives an additional degree of freedom to the regulator who can use
it to adjust downward the incentives to become prosumer. The export
fee under partial-netting plays the same role as the fixed prosumer
fee in the net metering case. One key issue with partial-netting is the
assessment of self-consumption and actual PV production which cannot
be measured without bi-directional meters. As a result, the billing needs
to be contractually based on ex-ante estimations or expectations of
self-consumption profiles for typical prosumers.
15 In this system, there is a renewable energy credit (REC) to store the
xcess production from one billing to another.8
8. Conclusion
Investments in PV panels by households are intended to tackle
climate change by decreasing our reliance on fossil fuels and it is a key
element of the energy transition. The increase in installed distributed
renewable generation capacities has been backed by both a significant
decline in the cost of solar power technology and the introduction of
compensation mechanisms in many countries. However these policies
have often been blamed for not being cost reflective, resulting in inad-
equate incentives to invest for the prosumers and the grid operators.
This paper discusses how to integrate distributed generation into the
energy grid with different pricing and metering systems.
The key point of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of
how heterogeneous prosumer profiles for self-consumption, i.e. with
different synchronization factors, can be correctly incentivized to invest
efficiently in solar PV, depending on the tariff structure and the me-
tering technology available. Our main results are as follows. We show
that in an efficient outcome, only consumers who are relatively more
inclined to self-consume should invest in PV installations and become
prosumers. This selection can only be made under net purchasing when
the energy sold to the grid is priced lower than energy drawn from
the grid. Under net metering, the two flows have the same price,
self-consumption does not pay, and the investment decision is made
irrespective of the self-consumption level, resulting in inefficiencies.
Hence, we show that net metering not only encourages too much
investment in DPUs, but also attracts the wrong types of consumers
to invest in production from a grid management perspective.
Another key result is that even if the grid operator has no informa-
tion regarding self-consumption profiles of prosumers, efficient tariffs
can be achieved through net purchasing. However, to be the case,
tariffs should not be Coasian, i.e. fixed fees paid by consumers and
prosumers should exceed the grid operator’s fixed costs. Overall, our
paper highlights that net purchasing without Coasian tariffs provide
a better way to integrate prosumers in the energy system. As the
question is highly relevant in policy debates, we believe that these
conclusions can be of interest for regulators dealing with the integration
of prosumers in the energy system.
The analysis provided in this paper is based on several assumptions
that partly influence the conclusions and some model limitations that
deserve discussion. First, in our analysis, we use a simplified and uni-
dimensional parameter to represent the degree of correlation between
of consumption and production of DPUs. This assumption allows us
to ensure a fair tractability and readability of the results. However,
it can be easily removed using a more general framework with a
minute-to-minute matching between the demand and the decentralized
production of energy. Indeed, let us consider that all consumers have a
fixed path of consumption 𝑞(𝑡, 𝛾) where 𝑡 is time and 𝛾 is a parameter
capturing the heterogeneity in energy consumption in the population.
Synchronization is a consequence of the adequacy between 𝑘 (𝑡) the
energy flow produced by the DPU at time 𝑡, and consumption 𝑞 (𝑡, 𝛾).
Heterogeneity in consumption or production (if consumers are located
at different places with different levels of solar irradiation) leads to
heterogeneity in self-consumption. Indeed, self-consumption levels at
time 𝑡 are given by min{𝑞 (𝑡, 𝛾) , 𝑘(𝑡)} so the degree of self-consumption
at time 𝑡 is time-dependent and writes 𝜑(𝑡, 𝛾) = min{𝑞(𝑡,𝛾),𝑘(𝑡)}𝑘(𝑡) . In our
model, the self-consumption rate 𝜑 is equal to the weighted average of
𝜑(𝑡, 𝛾) over the billing period. At period 𝑡, a prosumer is a net exporter
of energy when 𝑞 (𝑡, 𝛾) < 𝑘(𝑡) and net importer when 𝑞 (𝑡, 𝛾) > 𝑘(𝑡). As
a result, these assumptions would allow for temporary self-sufficiency
for some prosumers, specifically when at a given time 𝑡, 𝑞 (𝑡, 𝛾) < 𝑘(𝑡).
Using such a framework, one can establish the dynamic foundations for
our model and prove that our results still hold.16
16 An addendum for this case can be requested to the authors.










































𝑐 CPU energy production unit cost
𝑐𝑑 Total net distribution cost
𝐶 Total cost
𝐶𝑑 and 𝐶𝑔 Total distribution costs and generation cost
𝑓 (⋅), 𝐹 (⋅) Distribution, cumulative functions for DPU installation cost
𝑔(⋅), 𝐺(⋅) Distribution, cumulative functions for synchronization factor
𝑘 and ?̃? DPU flow of energy and capacity
𝐾𝑙 and 𝐾𝑐 Additional fixed grid cost of connecting a prosumer and a standard
user
?̄?𝑙 Total fixed grid cost associated with prosumers
𝐻(⋅) (Inverse) hazard rate function based on 𝑓
𝑀 Mass of prosumers is M
𝑝 Energy price
𝑞 Fixed level of electric consumption
𝑟 Network fee with net metering
𝑟𝑚 and 𝑟𝑥 Network export and import fees with net purchasing
𝑆 Fixed gross surplus level derived from consumption
𝑈 Net surplus/utility level for a consumer
𝑉𝑐 and 𝑉𝑙 Total volume of centralized and local distribution
𝑥 Prosumption decision binary variable
𝑧 and ?̃? Unit costs of installation of DPU (flow and capacity)
𝑧 and ?̄? Bounds for the unit costs of installation of DPU
𝛽 Average load factor of a consumer
𝛿 Unit environmental cost/damage
𝜑 Degree of self-consumption
𝜃 Variable grid costs of power distribution
𝜃𝑙 and 𝜃𝑐 Variable grid costs of power distributed by local exchanges and
centralized
𝜌 Consumer fixed fee
Second time-varying tariffs, capacity tariffs and tariffs conditioned
n the synchronization rate are not considered in our model and merit
urther analysis. However, these tariffs require individual smart meters
nd, to remain non-discriminatory, most legislations require a complete
ollout of the technology. According to the latest figures, this rollout
as not yet been achieved in most European countries (ACER/CEEM,
019); in some exceptional cases, an extra decade or longer will even be
eeded to reach the 80% coverage goal initially set for 2020 by the EU
ommission. This concern is also observed elsewhere (Draugelis et al.,
018). For example, in the U.S., as of 2018, only around 50% of the
opulation had a smart meter at home.
Third, we do not consider the intermittent dimension of DPU for
rosumers as we assumed a simplified calibrated load factor for any
PU installed. The effects of intermittency have been already analyzed
n the economic literature together with the role of storage and bat-
eries (see for instance Dato et al. (2019)). Introducing intermittency
or distributed renewable generation units in the analysis calls for a
ynamic and stochastic version of the model we analyzed. Nevertheless,
s the uncertainty about the load factor of the DPU can be anticipated
x ante anticipated by prosumers and the DSO, all results we present
till hold at their expected levels. However, due to potential risk
version behaviors of agents involved in the market relations at stake,
ome standard deviations of the optimal tariffs should be considered as
track for future research.
Fourth, the recent appearance of energy communities as well as the
ocal exchanges between prosumers leads to imagine that grid pricing
ssues may now be related to the need of coordination between these
gents at a local level (see Abada et al. (2020)). Energy communities
an facilitate the coordination of investments at the local level, but their
mplementation could be complex. These aspects have been neglected
n our analysis and are left for further research.17
17 Cortade and Poudou (2020) analyze the noncooperative inner incentives
o install DPU for prosumers able to exchange their energy in excess through
eer-to-peer platforms.9
Finally, we emphasize the role of tariff design but some further
challenges are also on the table, especially for net purchasing systems.
Following the IRENA (2019, p. 11) ‘‘to enable the adoption of net billing
schemes, a method must be developed to send the right price signals to
prosumers’’, identifying four key factors that are (i) the determination
of appropriate mechanisms to recover network costs, (ii) methods for
valuing the electricity supplied by distributed generation according to
system needs, (iii) deployment of advanced metering infrastructure and
(iv) prosumer awareness, empowerment and engagement via automa-
tion. We mainly addressed the first one in this paper and the three
others may constitute tracks for future works.
9. Nomenclature of variables
We provide a nomenclature of variables used in our model. De-
pending on the regimes studied all of them can be stared, tilded or
hatted and adorned with a subscript or superscript letter/number (see
Table 1).
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Straightforwardly, by pointwise optimization
and from the linearity of the integrand of (4) with respect to 𝑧.
Proof of Proposition 3. From expression (6) in the text, we can derive
?̃?0 = 𝑐 + 𝑟0 and rewrite it as:
?̃? = 𝑧∗ (𝜑) + (1 − 𝜑) 𝜃 + (1 − ?̄?)
𝐹 (?̃?) 𝑘
𝑞 − 𝐹 (?̃?) 𝑘
𝜃 +
𝑞
𝑞 − 𝐹 (?̃?) 𝑘
𝐾𝑙
𝑘
> 𝑧∗ (𝜑) .
et metering: Optimal two-part tariff. The problem is now:
min
𝑟
𝐶 (𝑟) = (𝑐 + 𝜃) 𝑞 +
(
𝑟𝑘 − 𝜃𝑘?̄? +𝐾𝑙
)
𝐹 (𝑟 + 𝑐) +𝐾𝑐








𝑟𝑘 − 𝜃𝑘?̄? +𝐾𝑙
)








where 𝐻 (𝑧) = 𝐹 (𝑧)𝑓 (𝑧) ≥ 0 and is increasing in 𝑧. If 𝐹 (𝑧) is logconcave this
mplies





(1 − ?̄?) 𝜃 + 𝐾𝑙𝑘
)





















































here we denote 𝑌 (𝑧) = 𝑞−𝐹 (𝑧)?̄?𝑘𝑞−𝐹 (𝑧)𝑘 , a strictly increasing positive function
f 𝑧 with 𝑌 (0) = 1. Then, for all 𝑧 ∈ [0, 1]:
𝜃𝑌 (𝑧) + 𝑐 +
𝐹 (𝑧)
𝑞 − 𝐹 (𝑧) 𝑘




and since 𝜃𝑌 (𝑧) + 𝑐 + 𝐹 (𝑧)𝑞−𝐹 (𝑧)𝑘𝐾𝑙 is also a strictly increasing positive
unction of 𝑧, this clearly shows that
?̃? < ?̃? and 𝑟 < 𝑟 .1 0 1 0






























































o 𝑟2 < 𝑟1 < 𝑟0. For the level of prosumption
?̃?1 − ?̃?2 = 𝑟1 −
𝐾𝑙
𝑘
− 𝑟2 = 𝜃
(












o ?̃?2 < ?̃?1 < ?̃?0.
These relationships are represented in Fig. 5.
roof of Proposition 4. With the tariff structure proposed in (8) and











𝑉𝑐 + 𝜃𝑉𝑙 − 𝑐𝑑

















𝑧∗ (𝜑) − 𝑐
)
𝐹 (?̂? (𝜑)) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑.
At the first-best outcome, we have that ?̂? (𝜑) = 𝑧∗ (𝜑). Rearranging the





so the DSO cannot break even and the first-best outcome cannot be
achieved.
Proof of Proposition 5. Again, ?̂? = 𝐾𝑐 . With net purchasing, the total















(𝑧 − 𝑐) 𝑘 − 𝜑𝑘𝜃 +𝐾𝑙
]















?̂? (𝜑) − 𝑧∗ (𝜑)
]
𝐹 (?̂? (𝜑)) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑
)
𝑘
Indeed at this optimum, it cannot be the case that the DSO break-even
constraint is slack, as we have seen in Proposition 4 that the cost-




= 0. The tariff structure that





















𝐹 (?̂? (𝜑)) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑 and ?̂? = ∫
1
0
𝜑𝐹 (?̂? (𝜑)) 𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑
here ?̂? is the mean value for the synchronization factor for prosumers



















?̂? + 𝐾𝑙𝑘 ?̂?








?̂? + 𝐾𝑙𝑘 ?̂?
(11)




𝜑2𝑓 (?̂? (𝜑))𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑 > 0 ; ?̂? = ∫
1
0




(1 − 𝜑) 𝑓 (?̂? (𝜑))𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑 > 0,
̂ = ?̂? − ?̂? = ∫
1
0
(1 − 𝜑)2 𝑓 (?̂? (𝜑))𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑 > 0; and
̂ = ?̂? + ?̂? = ∫
1
0
𝜑𝑓 (?̂? (𝜑))𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑 > 0 ; 𝐹 = ∫
1
0
𝑓 (?̂? (𝜑))𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑 > 0
ith ?̂? > ?̂?. Note that:
𝜕?̂?
𝜕𝑟𝑚







































𝑓 (?̂? (𝜑))𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑 = 0.














?̂? (𝜑) − 𝑧∗ (𝜑)
)









?̂? (𝜑) − 𝑧∗ (𝜑)
)
(1 − 𝜑) 𝑓 (?̂? (𝜑))𝑔 (𝜑) 𝑑𝜑,































































?̂? + 𝐾𝑙𝑘 ?̂?
. (12)
quating (11) and (12) and substituting (10) leads to























?̂? + ?̂? − 1
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